- "Brandom (Robert) - Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing & Discursive Commitment" defends Davidson’s claim that conceptual thought can arise only on the background of a practice of mutual interpretation, without endorsing the further view that one can be a thinker only if one has the concept of a concept. This involves (inter alia) giving an account of conceptual content in terms of what Brandom calls practical deontic attitudes.
- In this paper, I make a plea for the conclusion that these practical attitudes are best seen as intentional, but non-conceptually contentful.
- In particular, I argue that the hypothesis that Brandom’s practical deontic attitudes are non-conceptually contentful wouldn’t conflict with his view that non-conceptual intentionality is merely derivative.
- I then explore some of the implications which this hypothesis might have with respect to various forms of intentional ascent.
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