God and His/Her Act of Creation: Leibniz and the 'Why-Not-Sooner' Argument
de la Torre (Abel B. Franco Rubio)
Source: Sorites 12, May 2001: 33-54
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

    The question about how to conceive God’s act of creation in a fashion compatible with Leibniz’s own thought is in itself a cluster of complex and interrelated issues. I will discuss only three aspects (or conglomerates of aspects) of the issue: (1) Leibniz’s view of how God actually created the world, and within this and more specifically, (2) his arguments to reject the «why-did-God-not-create-the-world-sooner» question as not applicable to this case, and (3) the consequences of those arguments for the concept of time. I will argue that, given Leibniz’s own view of creation and time, (1) the question about why God did not create the world earlier or later is a legitimate one despite his explicit efforts in the opposite sense, and, furthermore, (2) an answer to the question within Leibniz’s thought would fall prey of fatal contradictions and inconsistencies.


Filed electronically with the full edition of Sorites 12

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