God and His/Her Act of Creation: Leibniz and the 'Why-Not-Sooner' Argument
de la Torre (Abel B. Franco Rubio)
Source: Sorites 12, May 2001: 33-54
Paper - Abstract

Paper Summary


Author’s Abstract

    The question about how to conceive God’s act of creation in a fashion compatible with Leibniz’s own thought is in itself a cluster of complex and interrelated issues. I will discuss only three aspects (or conglomerates of aspects) of the issue: (1) Leibniz’s view of how God actually created the world, and within this and more specifically, (2) his arguments to reject the «why-did-God-not-create-the-world-sooner» question as not applicable to this case, and (3) the consequences of those arguments for the concept of time. I will argue that, given Leibniz’s own view of creation and time, (1) the question about why God did not create the world earlier or later is a legitimate one despite his explicit efforts in the opposite sense, and, furthermore, (2) an answer to the question within Leibniz’s thought would fall prey of fatal contradictions and inconsistencies.

Comment:

Filed electronically with the full edition of Sorites 12

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