Fodor's Epistemic Intuitions of Analyticity
Wright (Wayne)
Source: Sorites 14, October 2002: 110-116
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

    This paper argues that Jerry Fodor fails to adequately motivate his informational semantics because he does not exclude molecularism, a principal rival to his account of concepts. Supporting my position are Fodor’s inability to explain away the strong intuitions often held on behalf of analyticity and his not offering a convincing argument for his claim that there is no way of making a principled analytic/synthetic distinction. Since he wishes to defend necessity and a prioricity, both of which are condemned by the Quinean anti-analyticity arguments, while denying analyticity, Fodor must provide an anti-analyticity argument of his own if his informational semantics is to be accepted. The result is that we have no reason to abandon the claim that there are meaning-constitutive interconceptual connections in favor of Fodor’s atomistic informational semantics.


Filed electronically with the full edition of Sorites 14

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