A Dilemma for Robust Alethic Relativism
Ferraiolo (William)
Source: Sorites 14, October 2002: 36-41
Paper - Abstract

Paper Summary


Author’s Abstract

    Robust alethic relativism is the thesis that no truth bearer is objectively true or false. According to the robust alethic relativist, the most we can ever say of any truth bearer (statement, belief, proposition, etc.) is that it is true or false relative to some conceptual framework, worldview, or other parameter (i.e. that it is «true-for-X»). In this paper, I will argue that robust alethic relativism is either self-refuting, or an entirely trivial and uninteresting thesis that cannot coherently serve as a theory of truth. I hope to show that Socrates understood this difficulty for the full-blooded relativist, and that his attack on alethic relativism is more effective than some have recognized.

Comment:

Filed electronically with the full edition of Sorites 14

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



© Theo Todman, June 2007 - April 2018. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page