Cartesianism and the Private Language Argument
Garrett (Brian)
Source: Sorites 14, October 2002: 57-62
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. In this paper, I argue that neither the #257 argument nor the #258 argument in Wittgenstein1’s Philosophical Investigations undermines the coherence of the Cartesian Model, according to which a sensation word, such as ‘headache’ or ‘tickle’, gets its meaning in virtue of an act of ‘inner’ association or ostensive definition.
  2. In addition, I argue against the standard assumption that the diarist’s language of #258 is logically private.


Filed electronically with the full edition of Sorites 14

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