On Quine's Arguments Concerning Analyticity
Baker (Shaun)
Source: Sorites 15, December 2004: 56
Paper - Abstract

Paper Summary


Author’s Abstract

    In a detailed examination of Quine’s Two Dogmas of Empiricism, I argue that Quine fails to make the case that there are no analytical truths in ordinary language. Drawing on admissions he makes with regard to definitions and languages’ relationship to pragmatic considerations, and an examination of his arguments concerning the interdefinability of the terms ‘synonymous’, and ‘analytic’, I argue that analytic truths exist as deducible consequences of the various uses to which language or sub-languages are put.

Comment:

Filed electronically with the full edition of Sorites 15

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