What is a Value Judgement?
Spielthenner (Georg)
Source: Sorites 16, December 2005
Paper - Abstract

Paper Summary

Author’s Abstract

    The purpose of this paper is to clarify the concept of a value judgement. I present here my view on this problem, which is a version of non-descriptivism (or non-cognitivism) that is similar to but not identical to traditional non-descriptivist theories. The thesis I want to explain and argue for is that S makes a value judgement about x if and only if S expresses his attitude towards x. I explain first explain this thesis by (I) clarifying the concept of an attitude, in (II) I defend the identity between having an attitude towards something and evaluating it, in (III) I distinguish value judgements from judgements that only seem to be evaluative, in (IV) I clarify what I mean by ‘expressing an attitude’, and in section (V) I give a concise argument for my view.


Filed electronically with the full edition of Sorites 16

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