Hyper Libertarianism and Moral Luck
Harrison (Gerald)
Source: Sorites 16, December 2005
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

    This paper argues that if the principle of alternate possibilities is false, as many now believe, then there is a non-question begging reason to favour a hyper-libertarian position over compatibilism. It will be argued that only a hyper libertarian position has the resources to provide a principled explanation of the reality of moral luck, something a compatibilist position cannot do.

Comment:

Filed electronically with the full edition of Sorites 16

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