Does Frege’s Definition of Existence Invalidate the Ontological Argument?
Labenz (Piotr)
Source: Sorites 17, December 2006
Paper - Abstract

Paper Summary


Author’s Abstract

    It is a well-known remark of Frege’s that his definition of existence invalidated the ontological argument for the existence of God. That has subsequently often been taken for granted. This paper attempts to investigate, whether rightly so. For this purpose, both Frege’s ontological doctrine and the ontological argument are outlined. Arguments in favour and against both are considered, and reduced to five specific questions. It is argued that whether Frege’s remark was right depends on what the answers to these questions are, and that for the seemingly most plausible ones — it was not.

Comment:

Filed electronically with the full edition of Sorites 17

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