Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy
Bealer (George)
Source: DePaul & Ramsey - Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, 1998
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsDisclaimer


Philosophers Index Abstract

    The phenomenology of a priori intuition is explored at length (where a priori intuition is taken to be not a form of belief but rather a form of seeming, specifically intellectual as opposed to sensory seeming). Various reductive accounts of intuition are criticized, and Humean empiricism (which, unlike radical empiricism, does admit analyticity intuitions as evidence) is shown to be epistemically self-defeating. This paper also recapitulates the defense of the thesis of the 'autonomy' and 'authority' of philosophy given in the author's "A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy" (Philosophical Studies, 1996).

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Dec 2019. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page