Meeting the Hare in her Doubles: Causal Belief and General Belief
Sainsbury (Mark)
Source: In "Impressions of Hume" edited by M Frasca-Spada and P Kail. OUP 2005
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    Hume's second definition of causation1 defines belief in a causal generalization in terms of causal relations between beliefs which do not have causal content. The idea is instructive: but can it do justice to the distinction between accidental generalizations (including accidental generalizations about causal relations) and nonaccidental, genuinely causal, generalizations? The paper argues that although it cannot accomplish precisely this, it can throw light on the contents of beliefs in other ways.

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  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
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