The Identity Theory of Truth
Baldwin (Thomas)
Source: Mind, Vol. 100, No. 1, Jan., 1991, pp. 35-52
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    Surprisingly, both Bradley and his critics, Moore and Russell, at one time agreed in holding the truth of a judgment to consist in its identity with a fact. For Bradley, such an identity is unattainable; hence truth is impossible. But the introduction of propositions in the early philosophy of Moore and Russell makes the application of the identity theory straightforward. However, it also leads to unacceptable consequences concerning falsehood, and for this reason Moore and Russell abandoned the theory. But its influence on Russell's later work is readily discerned; and even today Lewis1's theory of possible worlds approximates towards the position.

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