Instantiation as Partial Identity
Baxter (Donald L.M.)
Source: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 79, Number 4, December 01, 2001, pp. 449-464(16)
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. Construing the instantiation of a universal by a particular in terms of my theory of aspects resolves the basic mystery of this "non-relational tie," and gives theoretical unity to the four characteristics of instantiation discerned by Armstrong.
  2. Taking aspects as distinct in a way akin to Scotus's formal distinction, I suggest that instantiation is the sharing of an aspect by a universal and a particular – a kind of partial identity1.
  3. This approach allows me to address Plato's multiple location and one over many problems, Bradley's problem concerning the instantiation of relations, and the problem of change.

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  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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