Ackerman on Propositional Identity
Bertolet (Rod)
Source: Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 137, Oct., 1984, pp. 499-504
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Philosophers Index Abstract

    Diana Ackerman is perhaps the most recent philosopher to deploy one of the principles often entitled "Leibniz's law1" to argue that at least some propositions containing different but co-referential singular terms must be distinct. I attempt to show that her argument (and by implication its predecessors) fails because the attempt to appeal to the allegedly Leibnizian principle is illegitimate: either the principle is unacceptable, or else its use in the argument is question-begging.

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