Materialism and Disembodied Minds
Blose (B.L.)
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 42, No. 1, Sep., 1981, pp. 59-74
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. A belief almost universally held by philosophers - that the philosophical behaviorist cannot understand, cannot allow for the logical possibility of, disembodied existence1 - is taken to task.
  2. The author argues that in the last analysis the behaviorist has better resources than either the nonmaterialist philosopher of mind or the central-state or identity-theory materialist for providing an adequate conception of disembodied existence2, and he presents two sorts of disembodied existence3 that the behaviorist can understand - one that involves the power of acting on the bodily world or of being re-embodied or realized in it, and the other, satisfyingly less full-blooded, that is understood in terms merely of the logical possibility of acquiring this power.

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