Diachronic Identity as Relative Identity
Borowski (E.J.)
Source: Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 100, Jul., 1975, pp. 271-276
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. "Pragmatic" identity, concerned with identification of stages or parts of a spatio-temporally extended object as parts of that object, and "strict" or "Leibnizian" identity are distinguished, and it is shown that in ordinary usage referring expressions may be ambiguous as between stage and continuant.
  2. It is argued that the recognition of this twin ontology solves the traditional paradox of change, and also reconciles the views of Geach and Quine on relative identity1: Geach is concerned with the criteria for grouping parts into whole, and Quine with the strict identity of these wholes.

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