On the Ontological Priority of Physical Objects
Brody (Baruch)
Source: Nous, Vol. 5, No. 2, May, 1971, pp. 139-155
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Philosophers Index Abstract

    This paper begins with a critical analysis of Strawson's arguments for the claim that physical objects are ontologically prior to all other individuals. It is shown that his arguments employ several major assumptions whose justification is very unclear. I then suggest that more progress could be made by thinking about these issues in terms of the problem of identity rather than, as he does, in terms of the problem of individuation1. Finally, I offer a new argument, based upon the theory of identity for particulars, for the ontological priority of enduring entities.

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