Sameness Through Change and the Coincidence of Properties
Browning (Douglas)
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 49, No. 1, Sep., 1988, pp. 103-121
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsBooks / Papers Citing this PaperNotes Citing this PaperDisclaimer

Philosophers Index Abstract

    Any attempt to assimilate the relation of numerical sameness in cases of sameness through change to the relation of identity as specified by Leibniz's law1 fails. This article tries to show why this is so. It argues, first, that the standardly accepted view of the application of Leibniz's law2 to such cases, though quite proper, does not rest upon nor presuppose such an assimilation. It then argues that any attempt to ensure the coincidence of properties in such cases by limiting the scope of Leibniz's law3 to "genuine properties" has the result of marking out what shall count as such properties in a manner which is either promiscuous or altogether arbitrary, and in any case vacuous.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)

© Theo Todman, June 2007 - March 2019. Please address any comments on this page to File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page