Many Minds Are No Worse than One
Papineau (David)
Source: British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 47, No. 2, Jun., 1996, pp. 233-241
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Philosophers Index Abstract

    This paper points out that, while Michael Lockwood's Everett-style many-minds interpretation of quantum mechanics1 rejects commonsense assumptions about consciousness and possibility, neither of these notions is particularly well understood anyway. Indeed the many-minds theory is no worse off than conventional thought with respect to these notions: it preserves the conventional "operational links" tying conscious to nonconscious facts, and probabilistic to nonprobabilistic facts; and it mimics conventional thinking in not giving any further theoretical explanation for these links. Its assumptions may be unfamiliar, but unfamiliarity is no argument against an elegant and empirically adequate scientific theory.

Comment:

Response to "Lockwood (Michael) - 'Many Minds' Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics" - Symposium: 'Many Minds' Interpretations of Quantum Mechanic2s

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