The Contingent Identity of Particulars and Universals
Casullo (Albert)
Source: Mind, Vol. 93, No. 372, Oct., 1984, pp. 527-541
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Philosophers Index Abstract

    The primary purpose of this paper is to argue that particulars in the actual world are nothing but complexes of universals1. I begin by briefly presenting bertrand russell's version of this view and exposing its primary difficulty. I then examine the key assumption which leads russell to difficulty and show that it is mistaken. The rejection of this assumption forms the basis of an alternative version of the view which is articulated and defended.

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