Relative Identity
Nelson (Jack)
Source: Nous, Vol. 4, No. 3, Sep., 1970, pp. 241-260
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Philosophers Index Abstract

    The author attacks the view that identity, like largeness, is a relative relation. The primary advocate of the view that identity is relative is p.T. Geach. It is argued that geach has not shown that the failure of the identity of indiscernibles1 principle, as a truth of logic, forces us to stop taking indiscernibility within particular formal theories or languages as a sufficient condition for identity. The author also argues that the whole notion of relative identity2, as explicated by geach, is very probably incoherent.

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