Impossible Worlds
Salmon (Nathan)
Source: Salmon (Nathan) - Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Meaning, 2005
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    Responding to william r carter ("philosophical review" 1983, 223-31), the author endorses an intentionally vague essentialist principle concerning the original matter of artifacts. Multiple necessitations of this principle are invoked to argue that "s4" modal1 propositional logic is incorrect, and that there are distinct yet materially indiscernible worlds, resulting in a theory of impossible worlds. Principles of the identity of factually indiscernible worlds and of the identity of mutually accessible materially indiscernible worlds are proposed. (OSO): It is argued, against Randolph Carter, that if there are merely possible worlds, then indeed there are also impossible worlds. Worlds are things, but impossible worlds are not impossible things. A world, in the sense in which the actual world is only one among many, is a maximal scenario, a total way for things to be-all things. The actual world is the way things are. Merely possible worlds are ways things might have been but are not. Impossible worlds are ways things could not have been.

    (PI): Responding to William R Carter ("Philosophical Review" 1983, 223-31), the author endorses an intentionally vague essentialist principle concerning the original matter of artifacts. Multiple necessitations of this principle are invoked to argue that "s4" modal2 propositional logic is incorrect, and that there are distinct yet materially indiscernible worlds, resulting in a theory of impossible worlds. Principles of the identity of factually indiscernible worlds and of the identity of mutually accessible materially indiscernible worlds are proposed.

Comment:

Photocopy filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 16 (S1: Sa-Sl)". Electronic available at OSO

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