|Could I conceive being a brain in a vat?|
|Collier (John D.)|
|Source: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 68, Number 4, December 1990, pp. 413-419(7)|
|Paper - Abstract|
|Paper Statistics||Notes Citing this Paper||Colour-Conventions||Disclaimer|
… 1) a correspondence theory of truth,
… 2) bivalence of properties, and
… 3) the existence of a world independent of our representations.
Its important consequences are that truth is radically non-epistemic, and that an ideal theory might be false. Although traditional metaphysical realism has opposed relativism, there is nothing intrinsic to Putnam's characterisation of it that rules relativism out. In particular, the correspondence theory of truth allows that different representations can correspond to the same reality, as long as the mode of their correspondence is different.
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