- Many physicalists are committed to an austere dichotomy: either beliefs, desires and intentions are scientifically respectable or attributions of such attitudes are all false. One physicalist, Daniel Dennett offers a third alternative, which seems to permit a kind of instrumentalism concerning attitudes.
- I argue that Dennett's attempt to reconcile an instrumentalistic account of attributions of attitudes with a thoroughgoing physicalism founders on unresolvable conflicts between his official theory and his actual treatment of key concepts. As a result, instrumentalism concerning attitudes is exposed as inadequate to be a genuine alternative to the physicalist's dichotomy.
- See Link
- Originally in Philosophy of Science, Vol. 56, No. 2. (Jun., 1989), pp. 303-316
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