Neither Universals Nor Nominalism. Kinds and the Problem of Universals
Summerford (James)
Source: Metaphysica 4.1 (2003), pp. 101-126
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsDisclaimer


Author's Abstract

    The aim of this paper is to forward a plausible solution to the problem of universals1 that is able to avoid both the problems that nominalism encounters and those that realist theories admitting universals2 encounter. I argue that a view that accepts the ostrich nominalist’s answers to the problems of property possession and predication and couples them with an ontology that admits kinds as a form of abstract object proves superior both to existing nominalist theories and to traditional realist theories. It avoids the regress problems that have plagued traditional realism and is able to offer a satisfactory account of abstract reference in a way which nominalist theories cannot.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Oct 2018. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page