<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Alward (Peter) - Is Phenomenal Pain the Primary Intension of 'Pain'? (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_09/PaperSummary_9766.htm">Is Phenomenal Pain the Primary Intension of 'Pain'?</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/A/Author_Alward (Peter).htm">Alward (Peter)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Metaphysica 5.1 (2004), pp. 15-28</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=200><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_09/PaperSummary_9766.htm">Paper Summary</A></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><U>Author s Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">David Chalmers, in his recent book <I>The Conscious Mind</I><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P9766_1"></A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P9766_1"></A>, defends a conceivability argument for property dualism. In order to avoid the difficulties for such arguments posed by a posteriori necessities, he invokes a two-dimensional <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modal</A><SUP>2</SUP> framework. But in order to do this, he needs to make substantial assumptions linking thought and talk with elements of the framework. In particular, he needs to assume that phenomenal qualities serve as the primary intensions of our sensation terms. In this paper, I argue that this assumption cannot be sustained. </ol> </FONT><hr><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>Comment: </B><BR><BR>Review of <a name="2"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_74.htm">Chalmers (David) - The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory</A>".<BR><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U></B><a name="On-Page_Link_P9766_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P9766_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: <a name="3"></a>"<A HREF = "../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_74.htm">Chalmers (David) - The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory</A>". <BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-03T00:08" pubdate>03/08/2018 00:08:28</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>