|Is Phenomenal Pain the Primary Intension of 'Pain'?|
|Source: Metaphysica 5.1 (2004), pp. 15-28|
|Paper - Abstract|
David Chalmers, in his recent book The Conscious Mind1, defends a conceivability argument for property dualism. In order to avoid the difficulties for such arguments posed by a posteriori necessities, he invokes a two-dimensional modal2 framework. But in order to do this, he needs to make substantial assumptions linking thought and talk with elements of the framework. In particular, he needs to assume that phenomenal qualities serve as the primary intensions of our sensation terms. In this paper, I argue that this assumption cannot be sustained.
Review of "Chalmers (David) - The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory".
Footnote 1: "Chalmers (David) - The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory".
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