Vague Objects and Existence
Monaghan (P.X.)
Source: Metaphysica 5.1 (2004), pp. 59-66
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. How are vague objects relevant to one’s thinking about the truth-conditions for assertions of existence (e.g. ‘God exists’)?
  2. According to the standard account today, any assertion of existence ‘x exists’ is true just in case x is self-identical. But I have become dissatisfied with this account, and not merely because it seeks to pin the existence of a thing onto one of its other features, or because it seeks to identify existence as something else, something other than existence.
  3. Still, it is one thing to be intuitively dissatisfied with some view, and quite another to refute its essential conjecture. But that is why vague objects are important. For if there are vague objects, then something exists that is not identical to anything whatsoever.
  4. The plan of the paper is as follows:-
    1. In the first section, I examine Gareth Evans’1 influential argument against vague objects.
    2. In section II, I show why his argument is unsound.
    3. In section III, I argue that the relation of indeterminate identity2 is reflexive for the domain of all and only vague objects.
    4. In section IV, I argue that if there are vague objects, then there is something that is not identical to anything whatsoever.
    5. And, lastly, in section V, I will argue that if there are vague objects, then vague objects exist. (In fact I will argue that anything that is, exists.)

In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 1: See "Evans (Gareth) - Can There Be Vague Objects?".

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