Temporal Parts and Temporary Intrinsics
Botterell (Anthony)
Source: Metaphysica 5.2 (2004), pp. 5-24
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    The problem of temporary intrinsics1 is the problem of how objects can persist through change. A popular line of thought holds that if the Metaphysic of Temporal Parts—or the MTP, for short—is adopted, then the problem of temporary intrinsics2 can be adequately resolved. On this view, the problem of temporary intrinsics3 and the MTP are linked, at least in the following sense: the MTP provides a solution to the problem of temporary intrinsics4, and so gives us reason for thinking that the MTP is true. In this paper I argue this line of reasoning is flawed. I consider an objection that friends of the MTP press against other solutions to the problem of temporary intrinsics5 and turn it against the MTP itself. The conclusion I draw is therefore conditional: if the MTP provides an adequate response to the problem of temporary intrinsics6, then the MTP provides no reason to reject our commonsense view of the nature of material objects.

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