Substrate
Hofmann (Frank)
Source: Metaphysica 5.2 (2004), pp. 35-63
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. This paper aims at a defense of the substratum theory, according to which there are concrete particulars which do not have any properties as constituents – called ‘substrata’ or ‘bare particulars’.
  2. The first and longer part of the defense will consist in rejecting three important objections against the substratum theory:
    → the incoherence objection,
    → the objection from bearership, and
    → the objection from the missing grounding of property possession.
  3. In the course of criticizing these objections, the basic features of substrata will come to light. They are particulars that instantiate properties (universals1), even though they do not have properties as constituents. Substrata may, however, instantiate certain properties essentially.
  4. The second part consists in a more ‘positive’ elaboration of the substratum theory. The hypothesis that will be put forward is: the space-time points are the ideal candidates for being the substrata of our world. Accepting this hypothesis brings with it a lot of explanatory potential and, in particular, it allows us to explain the phenomenon of qualitative change in a way that is superior to both perdurantism2 and endurantism3.

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  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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