Substrate
Hofmann (Frank)
Source: Metaphysica 5.2 (2004), pp. 35-63
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    This paper aims at a defense of the substratum theory, according to which there
    are concrete particulars which do not have any properties as constituents – called
    ‘substrata’ or ‘bare particulars’. The first and longer part of the defense will
    consist in rejecting three important objections against the substratum theory: the
    incoherence objection, the objection from bearership, and the objection from the
    missing grounding of property possession. In the course of criticizing these
    objections, the basic features of substrata will come to light. They are particulars
    that instantiate properties (universals)1, even though they do not have properties as
    constituents. Substrata may, however, instantiate certain properties essentially.
    The second part consists in a more ‘positive’ elaboration of the substratum theory.
    The hypothesis that will be put forward is: the space-time points are the ideal
    candidates for being the substrata of our world. Accepting this hypothesis brings
    with it a lot of explanatory potential and, in particular, it allows us to explain the
    phenomenon of qualitative change in a way that is superior to both perdurantism
    and endurantism2.

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