The Ontological Turn Misunderstood: How to Misunderstand David Armstrong's Theory of Possibility
Von Wachter (Daniel)
Source: Metaphysica 5.2 (2004), pp. 105-114
Paper - Abstract

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Author’s Abstract

  1. Armstrong says of his theory of possibility that it is ‘reductionist’.
  2. Fraser MacBride has argued at great length that it fails to be reductionist because for some statements it fails to provide non-modal1 truth-conditions.
  3. I argue that MacBride misunderstands Armstrong’s theory because its aim is not to provide truth-conditions.
  4. This illustrates how great a gulf there is between semantics and metaphysics, and between those whose aim is to provide truth-conditions and those whose aim is to provide truthmakers.

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