|Concepts and Properties|
|Source: Metaphysica 7.1 (2006), pp. 67-86|
|Paper - Abstract|
Concepts and properties are usually considered to be distinct universals1, but the present paper argues that of the usual candidates for distinguishing concepts from properties, all are inadequate. The paper also suggests two new candidates: The first claims that concepts are ontologically dependent on their possibly being possessed or grasped by some mind, while properties are not. The second claims that concepts enter into the type-token relation, but properties do not. These latter two criteria are rejected as well, leaving a general, conditional conclusion that if the options discussed exhaust the alternatives, then the concept of being F and the property of being F are identical.
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