Endurance and Fatalism
Forrest (Peter)
Source: Metaphysica 7.2 (2006), pp. 73-82
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsBooks / Papers Citing this PaperNotes Citing this PaperDisclaimer


Author’s Abstract

  1. If persons persist from one time to another they do so, I claim, by perduring, that is by having temporal parts.
  2. First I argue that if persons endure, that is persist without having temporal parts, then they have time-dependent properties.
  3. Next, I argue that if enduring persons change by having time-dependent properties, then fatalism, or, more accurately, ontological determinism, holds. Hence those of us who consider that ontological determinism is incompatible with our own experience of responsibility have reason to reject the thesis that persons endure.
  4. This is significant because endurance might otherwise be thought to cohere better with belief in responsibility than perdurance1.

Comment:

Wait to see if becomes available on-line. First few pages available in Abridged version.

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Apr 2020. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page