On identity and interchangeability in Leibniz and Frege
Angelelli (Ignacio)
Source: Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 8, no. 1-2 (1967), 94–100
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Philosophers Index Abstract

    The main purpose of this paper is to show that Leibniz did not accept what today is usually known as Leibniz's rule of substitutivity (or indiscernibility of identicals1, etc.). This purpose is attained by quoting three texts, in Latin, one of them not yet published. Another aim of the paper is to show how Frege believed that the rule Leibniz had used only for restricted calculi, could be extended to the ordinary language. This is construed as the source of the axiomatic status enjoyed by the rule among philosophers in the last century.

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