Non-existence does not exist
Routley (Richard)
Source: Notre Dame J. Formal Logic 11, no. 3 (1970), 289–320
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

    The main topics considered are criteria for the identity of individuals, and criteria for the existence of properties and of propositions. Other topics treated incidentally include: an extended sentential logic designed to take care of certain semantical paradoxes and truth-value gaps by allowing for statement-incapable (non-truth valued) sentences; axiomatisations of second order quantified modal logics1 and their various commitments; the identity of propositions and of properties; and certain problems concerning the existence of relations. The theory of identity extends to second-order of the theory of contingent and strict identities. Some interpretational difficulties for the logical theory are sketched. A detailed but inconclusive assessment, both logical and philosophical, is made of rival criteria for the existence of properties.

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