- Most philosophers who have endorsed the idea that there is such a thing as phenomenal content – content that supervenes1 on phenomenal character – have also endorsed what I call Standard Russellianism.
- According to Standard Russellianism, phenomenal content is Russellian in nature, and the properties represented by perceptual experiences are mind-independent physical properties.
- In agreement with Sydney Shoemaker (1994), I argue that Standard Russellianism is incompatible with the possibility of spectrum inversion without illusion.
- I then consider two defenses of Standard Russellianism against this objection.
- One, offered by Byrne and Hilbert (1997), attempts to show that those who accept the possibility of spectrum inversion without illusion are forced to misdescribe a similar case.
- The other, offered by Tye (2000), accepts the conceivability of spectrum inversion without illusion but denies its possibility.
- I argue that both responses fail. As a consequence, either phenomenal content is not Russellian, or experiences do not represent mind-independent physical properties.
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