Color Constancy and Russellian Representationalism
Thompson (Brad)
Source: Forthcoming in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Paper - Abstract

Paper Summary


Author’s Abstract

  1. Representationalism, the view that phenomenal character supervenes1 on intentional content, has attracted a wide following in recent years.
  2. Most representationalists have adopted Russellian representationalism, the view that phenomenal content is a kind of Russellian content.
  3. I argue that Russellian representationalism conflicts with the everyday experience of color constancy. Due to color constancy, Russellianism is unable to simultaneously give a proper account of the phenomenal content of color experience and do justice to its phenomenology.

Comment:

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Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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