Moral Value, Response-Dependence, and Rigid Designation
Thompson (Brad)
Source: Forthcoming in Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Paper - Abstract

Paper Summary


Author’s Abstract

  1. A rigidified response-dependent account of moral properties promises to provide us with a thoroughly naturalistic moral realism that explains these senses in which moral properties are both mind-dependent and mind-independent. The response-dependent aspect of the analysis makes moral properties to a certain extent mind-dependent. But by rigidification, objectivity is secured.
  2. However, Peter Railton (1996) has argued against rigidifying on actual human responses as a way to avoid moral relativism.
  3. After an exposition of response-dependent accounts of value and their virtues, I turn to Railton's thought experiment1 and show that it fails to pose a problem for rigidified response-dependence.

Comment:

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