|Animals, Babies, and Subjects|
|Source: Southern Journal of Philosophy, Summer 2001; 39(2): 157-167|
|Paper - Abstract|
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Philosophers Index Abstract
An argument against the psychological criterion1 of personal identity is that because it draws a distinction between a person and their body, it must treat persons as fundamentally different things than animals, because there is no such distinction to be made in the case of an animal. The paper argues that the psychological theorist should accept that animal subjects are not identical to their bodies either. This entails the existence of subjects which are distinct from bodies, but which lack self-consciousness2, high intelligence and moral agency. This conclusion is used to argue that psychological theorists can accept that babies are persons, and that you existed as a baby. Sections
(+ reference to Dennett).
A is a ‘person’ iff
… (i) A is a Person at some stage of A’s existence or
… (ii) A is a sort of subject that typically becomes a Person at some stage of its existence.
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