Skepticism and Nihilism
Unger (Peter)
Source: Nous, Vol. 14, No. 4, Special Issue on Epistemology, Nov., 1980, pp. 517-545
Paper - Abstract

Paper SummaryNotes Citing this Paper


Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. A dialectical argument is offered against the common sense view of things. This involves mutually reinforcing arguments for metaphysical nihilism1 and epistemological skepticism.
  2. The key idea is to give the evil demon's place in the Cartesian skeptical argument to a newly devised "sorites2" against the self3. That yields arguments that the reader knows nothing for certain and, eventually, is not even reasonable in believing anything.
  3. These arguments are offered as an improvement on some in the author's Ignorance4.
  4. The point of both skepticism and nihilism5 will be exploited once there is developed an appropriate precise language.



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 4:

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