- This entry concerns dualism in the philosophy of mind. The term ‘dualism’ has a variety of uses in the history of thought. In general, the idea is that, for some particular domain, there are two fundamental kinds or categories of things or principles.
- In theology, for example a ‘dualist’ is someone who believes that Good and Evil — or God and the Devil — are independent and more or less equal forces in the world. Dualism contrasts with monism, which is the theory that there is only one fundamental kind, category of thing or principle; and, rather less commonly, with pluralism, which is the view that there are many kinds or categories.
- In the philosophy of mind, dualism is the theory that the mental and the physical — or mind and body or mind and brain — are, in some sense, radically different kinds of thing. Because common sense tells us that there are physical bodies, and because there is intellectual pressure towards producing a unified view of the world, one could say that materialist2 monism is the ‘default option’. Discussion about dualism, therefore, tends to start from the assumption of the reality of the physical world, and then to consider arguments for why the mind cannot be treated as simply part of that world.
- History of Dualism
- Varieties of Dualism: Ontology
- 2.1 Predicate dualism
- 2.2 Property Dualism
- 2.3 Substance Dualism
- Varieties of Dualism: Interaction
- 3.1 Interactionism
- 3.2 Epiphenomenalism
- 3.3 Parallelism
- Arguments for Dualism
- 4.1 The Knowledge Argument Against Physicalism3
- 4.2 The Argument from Predicate Dualism to Property Dualism
- 4.3 The Modal4 Argument
- 4.4 Arguments from Personal Identity
- 4.5 The Aristotelian Argument in a Modern Form
- Problems for Dualism
- 5.1 The Queerness of the Mental
- 5.2 The Unity5 of the Mind
Other Internet Resources
For the full text, follow this link (Local website only): PDF File9.
Footnote 1: Taken from the 2007 edition.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2021
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)