Why We Really May Be Immaterial Souls
Unger (Peter)
Source: Unger - All the Power in the World, 2006, Chapter 7
Paper - Abstract

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Sections

  1. Recalling the Problem of the Many1
  2. A Couple of Comments on that Comparatively Uninteresting Problem
  3. The Experiential Problem of the Many2
  4. How the Singularity of Experiencing May Favor Substantial Dualism
  5. Many Overlapping Experiencers, but only One of Them Now Experiencing?
  6. Some Cases of Singular Causal Resolution
  7. An Immaterial Experiencer’s Causally Resolved Singularity Is a Relevant Singularity
  8. These Are Metaphysical Matters, Transcending All Purely Semantic Issues
  9. These Problems Transcend Questions of Spatial Boundary: On Complex Complexes
  10. Problems of Propensitively Redundant Propensitive Contributors
  11. Our Experiential Problem Doesn’t Presuppose any Suspicious Identifications
  12. The Problem of Too Many Real Choosers
  13. Wholly Immaterial Souls Favored over Emergentist Physical-and-Mental Complexes
  14. A Singular Physical Manifestation of Many Choosers’s Powers to Choose?
  15. Do These Problems Favor Substantial Dualism over Its Most Salient Alternatives
  16. Some Less Salient Options to a Quasi-Cartesian Substantial Dualism
  17. Aren’t Immaterial Souls Really Just Eliminable Middlemen?
  18. Wholly Immaterial Souls Are Generated Abruptly, Not Gradually
  19. Our Own Souls and the Wholly Immaterial Souls of Nonhuman Animals
  20. Metaphysically Material Ruminations about Extraordinarily Different Gestations
  21. People and Nonhuman Animals Again: Might All Souls be Equally Powerful Individuals?
  22. Bodily Flexibility as regards Individualistically-directed Soulful Propensity
  23. Taking Stock and Moving On
    APPENDIX: Beyond Discriminative Vagueness, Safe from Nihilistic Sorites3

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  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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