The Mental Subject
Foster (John)
Source: Foster (John) - The Immaterial Self: Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind, 1991, Chapter 7
Paper - Abstract

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  1. The Issues.
  2. Can Corporeal Objects be Basic Subjects?
  3. Descartes versus Hume.
  4. Filling a Gap.
  5. The Nature of the Self.
  6. Non-human Animals.

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