Perception (II): Clarifying the Notion of Real Cognitive Relation and Assessing Contemporary Discussion
Braine (David)
Source: Braine (David) - The Human Person: Animal and Spirit, 1993, Chapter 3
Paper - Abstract

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Sections

  1. Contemporary accounts of perception remain bankrupt because they still sever it from behaviour, 94
    … (a) State of the problem: the revival of a non-realist conception of perceptual experience despite standing objections, 94
    … (b) The incoherence of the conception of experience as inner, 96
    … (c) The sameness in the epistemological impasse, 100
  2. The value of the notion of intentional object, 106
    … (a) The need for the notion of ‘intentional object', 107
    … (b) Fallacious arguments drawing on the ambiguity of the term "object", 109
    … (c) Rejecting any explanation of perception in terms of inner objects, and clarifying the contrast between perception and sensation, 114
    … (d) Looking as parasitic on the intentionality of seeing, 116
    … (e) The fundamental mistake in contemporary treatments of intentionality, 120
    Note on the vocabulary of intentionality, 125
  3. Perception as a real cognitive relation: the flouting of logical atomism, 127

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