<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Braine (David) - Perception (II): Clarifying the Notion of Real Cognitive Relation and Assessing Contemporary Discussion (Theo Todman's Book Collection - Paper Abstracts) </title> <link href="../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../TT_ICO.png" /></head> <BODY> <CENTER> <div id="header"><HR><h1>Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts</h1><HR></div><A name="Top"></A> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_11/PaperSummary_11957.htm">Perception (II): Clarifying the Notion of Real Cognitive Relation and Assessing Contemporary Discussion</A></th></tr> <tr><th><A HREF = "../../Authors/B/Author_Braine (David).htm">Braine (David)</a></th></tr> <tr><th>Source: Braine (David) - The Human Person: Animal and Spirit, 1993, Chapter 3</th></tr> <tr><th>Paper - Abstract</th></tr> </TABLE> </CENTER> <P><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=200><tr><td><A HREF = "../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_11/PaperSummary_11957.htm">Paper Summary</A></td></tr></TABLE></CENTER></P> <hr><P><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Contemporary accounts of perception remain bankrupt because they still sever it from behaviour, 94<BR>& (a) State of the problem: the revival of a non-realist conception of perceptual experience despite standing objections, 94<BR>& (b) The incoherence of the conception of experience as inner, 96<BR>& (c) The sameness in the epistemological impasse, 100</li><li>The value of the notion of intentional object, 106<BR>& (a) The need for the notion of  intentional object', 107<BR>& (b) Fallacious arguments drawing on the ambiguity of the term "object", 109<BR>& (c) Rejecting any explanation of perception in terms of inner objects, and clarifying the contrast between perception and sensation, 114<BR>& (d) Looking as parasitic on the intentionality of seeing, 116<BR>& (e) The fundamental mistake in contemporary treatments of intentionality, 120<BR>Note on the vocabulary of intentionality, 125</li><li>Perception as a real cognitive relation: the flouting of logical atomism, 127</li></ol><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR></P><a name="ColourConventions"></a><p><b>Text Colour Conventions (see <A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</b></p><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> <BR><HR><BR><CENTER> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T07:40" pubdate>02/08/2018 07:40:25</time> <br><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A></TD></TR> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>