Resemblance Cannot be Partial Identity
Denkel (Arda)
Source: Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 191, Apr., 1998, pp. 200-204
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    I demonstrate that analyzing the resemblance of properties in terms of partial identity1 has insuperable logical consequences. It follows that the strategy of vindicating the realism of universals2 against particularistic ontologies such as tropism by appeal to partial identity3 is incoherent.

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