The Problem of Psychophysical Causation
Lowe (E.J.)
Source: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 70, Number 3, September 1992, pp. 263-276(14)
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    It is widely supposed that interactionist dualism cannot plausibly be reconciled with the conservation laws of physics. These laws do not, however, imply that the physical universe is a causally closed system. Various dualist systems of psychophysical causation are shown to be consistent with our current knowledge of physical law, the most plausible such system being one in which mental causes impose structure on patterns of physical events without entering directly into chains of physical causation.

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