The Causal Autonomy of the Mental
Lowe (E.J.)
Source: Mind Vol. 102, No. 408, Oct., 1993, pp. 629-644
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    It is argued that physicalist accounts of mental causation1 cannot overcome the epiphenomenalist objection. A naturalistic version of dualism is proposed which regards consciousness as an emergent feature of biological systems possessing independent causal powers. An empirically feasible model of autonomous mental causation2 is outlined in which conscious states are facilitating rather than initiating causes of bodily behavior.

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