What Are We? Contents + References
Olson (Eric)
Source: What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology - Contents + References (November 2007: Oxford University Press.)
Paper - Abstract

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Contents

  1. The Question
    1.1. What are we1?
    1.2. Some Answers
    1.3. 'We'
    1.4. Rephrasing the question
    1.5. Must there be an answer?
    1.6. How the question differs from others
    1.7. Why it matters
  2. Animals
    2.1. Animalism
    2.2. What is an animal?
    2.3. The thinking-animal argument
    2.4. Are there animals?
    2.5. Can animals think?
    2.6. Too many thinkers
    2.7. Revisionary linguistics
    2.8. Animalism and our identity over time
    2.9. Further objections
  3. Constitution
    3.1. Material things constituted by animals
    3.2. The clay-modelling puzzle
    3.3. The replacement puzzle and the amputation puzzle
    3.4. Thinking animals again
    3.5. When does constitution occur?
    3.6. What determines our boundaries?
  4. Brains
    4.1. The brain view
    4.2. The thinking-brain problem
    4.3. The brain view and our identity over time
    4.4. Thinking-subject minimalism
    4.5. Direct involvement
    4.6. Homunculism
  5. Temporal Parts
    5.1. Four-dimensional hunks of matter
    5.2. Temporary intrinsics
    5.3. Lumps and statues
    5.4. The problem of modal incompatibility
    5.5. Puzzles of personal identity
    5.6. Thinking animals and other worries
    5.7. Thinking stages
    5.8. The stage view
  6. Bundles
    6.1. Bundle theories
    6.2. Traditional arguments for the bundle view
    6.3. Personal identity and the bundle view
    6.4. Can thoughts think?
    6.5. Thinking animals once more
    6.6. Bundles of universals
    6.7. The program view
  7. Souls
    7.1. Immaterialism
    7.2. Traditional arguments for immaterialism
    7.3. The paradox of increase
    7.4. The cost of materialism
    7.5. Objections to immaterialism
    7.6. Compound dualism
    7.7. Hylomorphism
    7.8. Simple materialism
  8. Nihilism
    8.1. We do not exist
    8.2. Is nihilism mad?
    8.3. Is nihilism self-refuting?
    8.4. Unity and simplicity
    8.5. Paraphrase: the mentalistic strategy
    8.6. Paraphrase: the atomistic strategy
    8.7. What it would mean if we did not exist
  9. What Now?
    9.1. Some results
    9.2. Some opinions
    9.3. Animalism and the thinking-parts problem
    9.4. Animalism and the clay-modelling puzzle
    9.5. Theories of composition
    9.6. Composition and what we are2
    9.7. Brutal composition
References
Comment:



In-Page Footnotes

Footnote 3: Not purchased, but see "Campbell (Keith) - The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars".

Footnote 4: References to Gallois and occasional identity are omitted from the book.

Footnote 5: References to this work are omitted from Olson’s book.

Footnote 6: I’ve not been able to find this (free) on-line. But see "Zimmerman (Dean) - Bodily Resurrection: The Falling Elevator Model Revisited".


Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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