- This page lists the Contents and References from "Olson (Eric) - What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology". These were online at Sheffield University: Eric Olson, but now seem to have been taken down, though I have taken copies. The electronic version of the References was paged backwards!
- The purpose of this page is firstly to make it easier for me to check out the references in "Olson (Eric) - What are We? A Study of Personal Ontology", but was also an opportunity for me to check that I had access to the books and papers.
- Those listed with a link from the Author’s name only are not in my possession, and likely never will be.
- The Contents has links to the full text of the draft Chapters – again taken from the above site when they were there – and to the various Notes I’m writing on the topics themselves.
Full Text: "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? The Question". Note1.
- The Question.
1.1. What are we2?
1.2. Some Answers
1.4. Rephrasing the question
1.5. Must there be an answer?
1.6. How the question differs from others
1.7. Why it matters3Animals4. Full Text: "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Animals".
2.2. What is an animal?
2.3. The thinking-animal argument6
2.4. Are there animals?
2.5. Can animals think?
2.6. Too many thinkers7
2.7. Revisionary linguistics8
2.8. Animalism9 and our identity over time
2.9. Further objectionsConstitution10. Full Text: "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Constitution".
3.1. Material11 things constituted by12 animals13
3.2. The clay-modelling14 puzzle
3.3. The replacement puzzle and the amputation puzzle. Note15
3.4. Thinking animals16 again
3.5. When does constitution17 occur?
3.6. What determines our boundaries?Brains18. Full Text: "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Brains".
4.1. The brain view19
4.2. The thinking-brain problem
4.3. The brain view and our identity over time
4.4. Thinking-subject minimalism
4.5. Direct involvement
4.6. Homunculism20Temporal Parts21. Full Text: "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Temporal Parts".
5.1. Four-dimensional hunks of matter
5.2. Temporary intrinsics22
5.3. Lumps and statues23
5.4. The problem of modal24 incompatibility
5.5. Puzzles of personal identity25
5.6. Thinking animals26 and other worries
5.7. Thinking stages
5.8. The stage view27Bundles28=20. Full Text: "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Bundles".
6.1. Bundle theories29
6.2. Traditional arguments for the bundle view30
6.3. Personal identity and the bundle view31
6.4. Can thoughts think?
6.5. Thinking animals32 once more
6.6. Bundles33 of universals34
6.7. The program view35Souls36. Full Text: "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Souls".
7.2. Traditional arguments for immaterialism
7.3. The paradox of increase
7.4. The cost of materialism38
7.5. Objections to immaterialism
7.6. Compound dualism39
7.8. Simple materialismNihilism41. Full Text: "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Nihilism".
8.1. We do not exist
8.2. Is nihilism42 mad?
8.3. Is nihilism43 self-refuting?
8.4. Unity44 and simplicity
8.5. Paraphrase: the mentalistic strategy
8.6. Paraphrase: the atomistic strategy
8.7. What it would mean if we did not existWhat Now? Full Text: "Olson (Eric) - What Are We? What Now?". Note45.
9.1. Some results
9.2. Some opinions
9.3. Animalism46 and the thinking-parts problem
9.4. Animalism47 and the clay-modelling48 puzzle
9.5. Theories of composition49
9.6. Composition and what we are50
9.7. Brutal composition
- "Anscombe (G.E.M.) - The First Person"
- "Ayer (A.J.) - Language, Truth and Logic"
- "Ayers (Michael R.) - Locke (Vol 2 - Ontology)"
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Why Constitution is Not Identity"
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View"
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Materialism with a Human Face"
- "Baker (Lynne Rudder) - On Making Things Up: Constitution and Its Critics"
- "Bennett (Karen) - Spatio-Temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem"
- "Blackburn (Simon) - Has Kant Refuted Parfit?"
- Franz Brentano. 1987. On the Existence of God. Dordrecht: Nijhoff. (Original work 1928.)
- "Burke (Michael) - Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge to the Standard Account"
- "Burke (Michael) - Dion and Theon: An Essentialist Solution to an Ancient Puzzle"
- "Burke (Michael) - Tibbles the Cat: A Modern Sophisma"
- "Burke (Michael) - Is My Head a Person?"
- "Butler (Joseph) - Of Personal Identity"
- Keith Campbell. 1990. Abstract Particulars51. Oxford: Blackwell.
- "Campbell (Scott) - The Conception of a Person as a Series of Mental Events"
- "Carnap (Rudolf) - The Logical Structure of the World / Pseudoproblems in Philosophy"
- "Carruthers (Peter) - Introducing Persons: Theories and Arguments in the Philosophy of Mind"
- "Carter (William) - How to Change Your Mind"
- "Chisholm (Roderick) - Person and Object"
- "Chisholm (Roderick) - The First Person: Essay on Reference and Intentionality"
- Roderick Chisholm. 1989. Is there a mind-body problem? In On Metaphysics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
→ Partly reprinted in "Chisholm (Roderick) - Which Physical Thing Am I? An Excerpt from 'Is There a Mind-Body Problem?'"
- "Chalmers (David) & Clark (Andy) - The Extended Mind"
- "Corcoran (Kevin), Ed. - Soul, Body and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons"
- "Dennett (Daniel) - Where Am I?"
- "Dennett (Daniel) - True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why it Works"
- "Dennett (Daniel) - Consciousness Explained"
- "Doepke (Frederick) - Spatially Coinciding Objects"
- "Doepke (Frederick) - The Kinds of Things: A Theory of Personal Identity Based on Transcendental Argument"
- "Dorr (Cian) - Merricks on the Existence of Human Organisms"
- "Elder (Crawford) - Real Natures and Familiar Objects"
- "Foster (John) - The Immaterial Self: Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind"
- "Foster (John) - A Brief Defense of the Cartesian View"
- Montgomery Furth. 1988. Substance, Form and Psyche: An Aristotelian Metaphysics. CUP.
- "Gallois (Andre) - Occasional Identity", Note52
- "Gallois (Andre) - Occasions of Identity : a Study in the Metaphysics of Persistence, Change, and Sameness"
- "Garrett (Brian) - Personal Identity and Self-consciousness"
- "Gibbard (Allan) - Contingent Identity"
- "Geach (Peter) - Reference and Generality (Selections)"
- Giles, J. 1997. No Self to be Found: The Search for Personal Identity. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
- "Grice (H. Paul) - Personal Identity"
- William Hasker. 1999. The Emergent Self. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- "Hasker (William) - Persons as Emergent Substances"
- "Haslanger (Sally) - Persistence Through Time"
- "Hawley (Katherine) - How Things Persist"
- "Heller (Mark) - Temporal Parts of Four-Dimensional Objects"
- "Heller (Mark) - The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-Dimensional Hunks of Matter"
- "Hershenov (David) - Do Dead Bodies Pose a Problem for Biological Approaches to Personal Identity"
- "Hestevold (H. Scott) - Conjoining"
- "Hoffman (Joshua) & Rosenkrantz (Gary) - Substance: Its Nature and Existence"
- "Horgan (Terence) - On What There Isn't"
- "Hudson (Hud) - A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person"
- "Hume (David), Mossner (Ernest) - A Treatise of Human Nature"
→ Partly reprinted in "Hume (David) - Treatise I.IV.VI: Of Personal Identity"
- "Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings"
- "Kant (Immanuel), Kemp Smith (Norman) - Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason"
- "Kim (Jaegwon) - Lonely Souls: Causality and Substance Dualism"
- "Levey (Samuel) - Coincidence and Principles of Composition"
- "Lewis (David) - Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic".
- "Lewis (David) - Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies".
- "Lewis (David) - Survival and Identity".
- "Lewis (David) - On the Plurality of Worlds"
- "Lewis (David) - Many, But Almost One"
- "Lewis (David) - Tensing the Copula"
- "Lewis (David) & Lewis (Stephanie) - Holes"
- "Locke (John), Nidditch (Peter) - An Essay Concerning Human Understanding"
→ Partly reprinted in "Locke (John) - Of Identity and Diversity"
- "Lowe (E.J.) - Kinds of Being: Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of Sortal Terms" (Note53)
- "Lowe (E.J.) - Substance and Selfhood"
- "Lowe (E.J.) - Subjects of Experience"
- "Lowe (E.J.) - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind"
- "Lowe (E.J.) - Identity, Composition, and the Simplicity of the Self"
- "Lowe (E.J.) - A Survey of Metaphysics"
- "Markosian (Ned) - Brutal Composition"
- Gareth B. Matthews. 1982. Accidental unities. In M. Schofield and M. Nussbaum, ed., Language and Logos. Cambridge University Press.
- "McMahan (Jeff) - The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life"
- "McDowell (John) - Reductionism and the First Person"
- "Mellor (D.H.) - Real Time II"
- "Merricks (Trenton) - There Are No Criteria For Identity Over Time"
- "Merricks (Trenton) - How to Live Forever Without Saving Your Soul: Physicalism and Immortality"
- "Merricks (Trenton) - Objects and Persons"
- "Myro (George) - Identity and Time" (Note54=53)
- "Nagel (Thomas) - The View from Nowhere"
- "Noonan (Harold) - Personal Identity".
- "Noonan (Harold) - Animalism Versus Lockeanism: A Current Controversy"
- "Noonan (Harold) - Persons, Animals and Human Beings (2010)"
- "Nozick (Robert) - Philosophical Explanations"
- "O'Leary-Hawthorne (John) & Cover (J.A.) - A World of Universals"
- "Olson (Eric) - Composition and Coincidence".
- "Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology"
- "Olson (Eric) - Relativism and Persistence"
- "Olson (Eric) - Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem"
- "Olson (Eric) - A Compound of Two Substances"
- "Olson (Eric) - What Does Functionalism Tell Us About Personal Identity"
- "Olson (Eric) - Thinking Animals and the Reference of 'I'"
- "Olson (Eric) - The Ontology of Material Objects"
- "Olson (Eric) - Was Jekyll Hyde?"
- "Olson (Eric) - An Argument for Animalism"
- "Olson (Eric) - Animalism and the Corpse Problem" (Note55=53)
- "Olson (Eric) - Is there a Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity"
- "Olson (Eric) - The Paradox of Increase"
- "Olson (Eric) - Temporal Parts and Timeless Parthood"
- "Parfit (Derek) - Lewis, Perry, and What Matters"
- "Parfit (Derek) - Reasons and Persons"
- "Perry (John) - Can the Self Divide?"
- "Perry (John), Ed. - Personal Identity"
- "Perry (John) - The Problem of Personal Identity"
- "Perry (John) - Personal Identity, Memory, and the Problem of Circularity"
- "Persson (Ingmar) - Our Identity and the Separability of Person and Organism"
- "Pike (Nelson) - Hume's Bundle Theory of the Self: A Limited Defense"
- "Puccetti (Roland) - Brain Bisection and Personal Identity"
- "Quine (W.V.) - Word & Object"
- "Quinn (Philip L.) - Tiny Selves: Chisholm on the Simplicity of the Soul"
- "Quinton (Anthony) - The Soul"
- "Quinton (Anthony) - The Nature of Things"
- "Rea (Michael), Ed. - Material Constitution - A Reader"
- "Rea (Michael) - Supervenience and Co-Location"
- "Rea (Michael) - In Defense of Mereological Universalism"
- "Rea (Michael) - Constitution and Kind Membership"
- "Reid (Thomas) - Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (I & II)"
- "Reid (Thomas) - Of Identity"
- "Robinson (Howard) - A Dualist Account of Embodiment"
- "Rosen (Gideon) & Dorr (Cian) - Composition as a Fiction"
- "Rovane (Carol) - The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics"
- "Russell (Bertrand) - The Philosophy of Logical Atomism"
- "Russell (Bertrand) - The Analysis of Mind"
- Marya Schechtman. 1997. The brain/body problem. Philosophical Psychology 10: 149-164.
- "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Immortality and Dualism"
- "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Identity, Properties, and Causality"
- "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Personal Identity: a Materialist Account"
- Sydney Shoemaker. 1995. Personal identity. In R. Audi, ed., The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
- "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Self and Substance"
- "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Self, Body, and Coincidence"
- "Shoemaker (Sydney) - Functionalism and Personal Identity - a Reply"
- "Sider (Ted) - All the World's a Stage"
- "Sider (Ted) - Four-dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time"
- "Sider (Ted) - Criteria of Personal Identity and the Limits of Conceptual Analysis"
- "Snowdon (Paul) - Persons, Animals, and Ourselves"
- "Snowdon (Paul) - Some Objections to Animalism"
- "Sosa (Ernest) - Subjects Among Other Things"
- "Stalnaker (Robert) - Counterparts and Identity"
- "Stone (Jim) - Parfit and the Buddha: Why There Are No People"
- "Stone (Jim) - Why there are still no people"
- "Strawson (Peter) - Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics"
- "Swinburne (Richard) - Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory"
- "Swinburne (Richard) - The Evolution of the Soul"
- "Taylor (Richard) - Metaphysics"
- "Thomson (Judith Jarvis) - Parthood and Identity Across Time"
- "Thomson (Judith Jarvis) - People and Their Bodies"
- "Thomson (Judith Jarvis) - The Statue and the Clay"
- "Tye (Michael) - Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity"
- "Unger (Peter) - I Do Not Exist"
- "Unger (Peter) - Why There Are No People"
- "Unger (Peter) - The Problem of the Many"
- "Unger (Peter) - Identity, Consciousness and Value"
- "Unger (Peter) - All the Power in the World"
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Possibility of Resurrection"
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Philosophers and the Words 'Human Body'"
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts"
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - An Essay on Free Will"
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - When are Objects Parts?"
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Material Beings"
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Four-Dimensional Objects"
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Composition As Identity"
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Materialism and the Psychological-continuity Account of Personal Identity"
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Ontology, Identity and Modality: Essays in metaphysics"
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - What Do We Refer to When We Say 'I'?"
- "Van Inwagen (Peter) - Metaphysics"
- "Wiggins (David) - On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time"
- "Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance"
- "Williams (Bernard) - Descartes - The Project of Pure Enquiry"
- "Wilson (Jack) - Biological Individuality - The identity and Persistence of Living Entities"
- "Wittgenstein (Ludwig) - Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus"
- "Yablo (Stephen) - Identity, Essence, and Indiscernibility"
- "Zimmerman (Dean) - Distinct Indiscernibles and the Bundle Theory"
- "Zimmerman (Dean) - The Compatibility of Materialism and Survival: The “Falling Elevator” Model"
- "Zimmerman (Dean) - The Constitution of Persons by Bodies: A Critique of Lynne Rudder Baker’s Theory of Material Constitution"
- "Zimmerman (Dean) - Material People"
Printout filed in "Olson (Eric) - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 13 (Olson)".
Footnotes 20, 28:
Footnote 51: Footnote 52: Footnotes 53, 54, 55:
- I don’t have a note on this – do I need one?
- References to this work are omitted from the hard-copy book.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2020
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)