- Shapiro and Raffman have, together, told an interesting and plausible psychological and pragmatic story about many of our judgements involving vague predicates.
- Shapiro explains how, if we focus on changes in conversational context (prompted by changes of score, in Lewis’s sense) then the fact that, when taken through a sorites1 series, subjects will at some point jump from applying the sorites2 predicate to denying that it applies, does not mean that those subjects are violating a plausible principle governing judgement, a principle that he labels the tolerance principle.
- In this paper, I am particularly concerned to take up a question Shapiro himself addresses: ‘what does this have to do with the semantics and logic?’ Is there a (relatively simple) way to get from facts about our judgements to facts about truth-conditions of the sentences expressed? In particular, what can facts about how subjects respond to members of a sorites3 series tell us about the true classifications along that series?
- First, I will briefly explore some features of, and possible problems with, the use of conversational score (in §2).
- Then I’ll take up the question of the bridge between the pragmatic and the semantic.
- And finally, in §4, I will ask what response to the sorites4 paradox Shapiro’s view can offer us.
See Link (Defunct).
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