Vague Objects
Tye (Michael)
Source: Mind, Vol. 99, No. 396, Oct., 1990, pp. 535-557
Paper - Abstract

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Philosophers Index Abstract

  1. I believe that there are vague objects. This view apparently is not shared by very many other philosophers.
  2. It is often said that the world is perfectly precise and that vagueness resides only in language. On the face of it, this is a deeply puzzling position; for common sense has it that the world contains countries, mountains, and islands, for example, and these items certainly do not seem to be perfectly precise.
  3. I attempt to clarify the thesis that there are vague objects, as I accept it, and I defend this thesis against sorites1 arguments and the argument from identity.

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