Epistemic Self-Respect
Christensen (David)
Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 18th June 2007
Paper - Abstract

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Author's Abstract

  1. I would like here to examine the idea that rationality entails a distinctive sort of epistemic self-respect: a respect we must have for our own beliefs that we need not have toward the beliefs of others, and which flows from some aspect of the first-person perspective1. I’d like to approach this question from within a framework that takes beliefs as coming in degrees, and takes probabilistic coherence as a rational constraint on how degrees of belief fit together. To avoid complication, I’ll use the simplest form of this framework by taking rational credences to be precise probabilities (though I believe that the lessons I’ll arrive at would survive generalization of this simple model).
  2. SR: Synchronic Reflection of Self Respect
    p(A / p(A) = n) = n
  3. MSR: Moderate Self Respect
    Informally: to the extent I’m confident of having some particular credence c in A, and to the extent that my actual credence in A is close to c, I must come close to satisfying SR with respect to A, given my having c in A. (And in the limit, where I’m absolutely certain, and correct, about having c in A, I must strictly satisfy SR with respect to A, given my having c in A.)
  1. Degrees of Belief and Expertise
  2. An Apparent Counterexample to SR
  3. Ideal Rationality and Epistemic Self-Respect
  4. Self-Knowledge, Dutch Strategies and Ideal Rationality
  5. Rationality and Self-Respect


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